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The Political Investment Cycle 
within China 
The Next Transition and Its Investment Implications 
By Abdur Chowdhury, PhD, and Barry K. Mendelson, CIMA" 
T his article explores the impor-tance and risks of internal infrastructure investments in 
China whether made directly by, or 
promoted by, the government or by for-
eigners. Two factors in our analysis are 
worth noting. 
First, China's internal investment as a 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
is now fast approaching 50 percent, up 
from slightly under 30 percent in 1982 
(Ahuja and Nabar 2012). This level of 
investment is high by most standards, 
including comparisons to other countries 
with similar development strategies 
or income levels. This investment 
historicaUy has been concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector, encouraged by 
various cost advantages, including a low 
cost of capital, labor, utilities, poUution 
control, energy, land, tax incentives, and 
an undervalued currency. 
Second, China changes its top politi-
cal leaders every decade and shuffles 
other high-ranking officials and local 
leaders every five years. These changes 
coincide with the National Communist 
Party congresses. The last party con-
gress took place in late 2012 leading 
to the change of political leadership in 
FIGURE 1: CHINA'S POST-PARTY CONGRESS INVESTMENT BOOM 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
o 
1980 
1985 - - - - - - --
ChIna booms alter 
[)eng X1aoplng 
coosoIidates his gr~ 
OIlpoweral1d 
iotroc1M;es mar1<et 
relorms 
Sources: World Bank; FT Research 
1985 
1993 - - - - - - - - - --
C/jna ~urches the \\OOd's 
IJiOgesthydr_ 
project. the nvee Gorges 
Qam, embIema1ic of a 
IlJ!IO push lor 
Inlrastruct ... de'Iefopmenl 
~ the 19905 
1990 1995 2000 
China-Hu Jintao being replaced as 
president by Xi Jinping. 
Interestingly, since Mao Zedong's 
death in 1976, Chinese leadership 
transitions have, like clockwork, been 
accompanied by a big jump in gov-
ernment spending (see figure 1). For 
example, in the second half of 2012 
provincial and municipal governments 
unveiled spending plans totaling more 
than RmblO trillion ($1.6 trillion). The 
National Development and Reform 
Commission, a powerful central plan-
ning agency, also approved about Rmb 
1 trillion worth of urban rail, road, and 
2005 2011 
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waterway projects. These large expendi-
tures are not isolated or rare historical 
events. The economic influence of this 
political cycle has been visible in invest-
ment spikes at the time of virtually 
every congress including 1977. 1982. 
1987. 1992.2002. and 2007. 
Recent studies on the nature of 
investment in China have shown that 
financial variables such as interest rates. 
the exchange rate. and the depth of the 
domestic capital market are important 
determinants of corporate investment 
(Ahuja and Nabar 2012; Geng and N'Diaye 
2012). Very few studies have looked at the 
influence of political factors on overall 
investment volume. This article will 
attempt to fill this gap in the literature. 
Why should the well-worn path of 
the political investment cycle in China 
interest outside investors? The answer 
is that China has the highest risk of an 
economic correction because of low 
investment productivity in recent years 
(Standard & Poors 2012). When the 
economy corrects. there should be a 
greater negative impact on real GDP 
growth given the high investment-GDP 
ratio. Therefore. the longer the period 
and the greater the size of the invest-
ment overhang to start with. the larger 
the economic correction. 
Three groups of countries should be 
most affected by a slowdown in invest-
ment in China. The first group includes 
China's geographic neighbors . These 
countries are strongly integrated in the 
Chinese supply chain. Goods made in a 
chain of production from various coun-
tries contribute inputs that are assembled 
in China and exported. Taiwan. Korea. 
Thailand. Malaysia. and the Philippines 
fall into this first group. For these coun-
tries. the impact is likely to be most pro-
found. Recent International Monetary 
Fund (lMF) estimates have shown that 
for Taiwan-which is likely to be most 
impacted-if investment in China were 
to fall by 1 percentage point. growth in 
Taiwan would fall by 0.9 percent. 
The second group of countries im-
pacted would be commodity exporting 
nations that are heavily dependent on 
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demand from China. When demand 
in China drops. commodity prices 
and commodity exports from those 
countries drop. So. for example. for a 
commodity producing country such as 
Chile. a I-percentage-point decline in 
investment in China translates into a 
0.4-percent drop in growth. For African 
commodities exporters. such as Zambia. 
there would be a slightly smaller impact. 
The third group of countries pro-
duces high-quality investment goods 
(Le .• finished products such as machin-
ery used for production) because China 
currently relies so heavily on investment. 
A sharp drop in this type of investment 
likely would have a significant impact on 
exporters of these finished goods. Even 
for large economies such as Japan or 
Germany. for example. a 1-percentage-
point decline in investment in China 
likely would lower economic growth by 
about 0.1 percent in Germany and Japan. 
This fractional impact is not trivial given 
the size of these economies. 
In short. Chinese investment has 
profound implications for commodity 
exporters and goods producers . A very 
sharp slowdown in investment in China 
would have a significant impact on 
growth in a wide array of countries. 
China's Economy 
The Chinese economy has accelerated in 
recent months and a number of factors 
suggest this pick-up in activity will per-
sist throughout 2013. Real GDP growth 
in the fourth quarter of 2012 jumped to 
8 percent year over year. encling seven 
consecutive quarters of decelerating 
expansions. The upturn reflected a size-
able rebound in net exports. a firm ing 
of fixed investments. and sustained 
gains in domestic consumption. In 2013 
momentum in economic growth should 
modestly increase. 
Domestically. private consumption 
likely will keep growing at a solid pace 
as real disposable income outpaces real 
GDP growth. In turn. rising creclit and 
pent-up demand stemming from prior 
policy tightening should continue to 
support improving real estate activity. 
Externally, a higher pace of growth 
among most of China's main Asian 
trading partners should offset the 
dampening effect on Chinese exports 
resulting from protracted weakness 
across advanced economies. In all. the 
Chinese economy should expand 8.2 
percent in 2013. a 0.4-percentage-point 
gain over 2012. 
A stronger Chinese upturn will 
reinforce improving growth dynam-
ics across Asia and other emerging 
markets. Ultimately, this will result in 
stronger global trade. which will have 
positive spill-over effects even in the 
United States and Canada. 
China relies mostly on its neighbors 
to drive exports. Chinese exports have 
increased in recent months. on the back 
of improving Asian demand for Chinese 
products, as well as on stronger sales 
to North America and Africa. In 2013. 
export momentum should improve as 
China's main trading partners in Asia 
and other emerging markets experi-
ence a further acceleration in domestic 
economic activity. Nevertheless. the 
persistency of only a modest expansion 
in the United States and a protracted 
Eurozone recession will limit the upside 
for growth of Chinese external sales. 
Stock Markets in China 
China's stock market performance has 
shown little relevance to its economic 
performance over the past two decades. 
From 1992, when the stock market was 
first established in Shenzen. until 2012. 
China has grown at an annual rate of 
around 10 percent. but its stock market 
performance has been very volatile. The 
behavior of the Chinese stock market 
has been affected little by the country's 
long-term growth potential and more 
by its regulatory policies and a lack of 
forceful enforcement of security laws 
and regulations, as well as short-term 
macroeconomic policies. Consequently. 
the Chinese stock market has become 
a haven for speculators rather than a 
place for long-term investment. 
Though China's recent performance 
doesn't stack up to that of previous 
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years, macroeconomic performance 
remains robust relative to emerging 
market peers as well as major advanced 
economies such as the United States, 
the European Union, and Japan. The 
contrast between China's GDP growth 
and its stock market returns raises 
questions about why China's market 
doesn't reflect its underlying economic 
fundamentals as the second-largest 
economy in the world. 
We believe that growth of around 
7- 8 percent a year is sustainable for 
China. It is also what the government 
set for itself as a goal in its 2012 Five-
Year Plan. That said, to achieve that 
pace of growth over the medium term 
China will have to change its growth 
model. Over the past few years, 
growth in China has relied very much 
on high and rising rates of internal 
investment. So, proprietary Chinese 
government investment has been very 
strong, capacity has been built, and 
infrastructure has been added, but this 
rapid pace cannot continue. Instead, 
over the next few years , there needs 
to be a smooth handover from invest-
ment to domestic consumption as the 
main source of growth in China. It is 
this domestic consumption and the 
desire of exporters to penetrate that 
market that creates interesting invest-
ment opportunities. 
Methodology and Empirical 
Results 
In this section we analyze the relation-
ship between investment and political 
factors and its implication for investors. 
In particular, we conduct an empirical 
analysis to explain the dynamics of 
investment in China and the impact 
of leadership change on the level of 
investment. Following the empirical 
literature, we use firm-level data to 
capture the effects of a number of factors 
on investment. These factors include 
stickiness in investment, adjustment 
costs (captured by the capital output ratio 
squared), capital market development, 
cost of capital, exchange rates, country 
risk, countries' level of development, 
Mining 44 2.3 1 
Manufacturing 1,111 58.23 
Utilit ies 69 3.62 
Construction 38 1.99 
Transportation 73 3.83 
Information Technology 151 7.91 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 101 5.29 
Anance and Insurance 34 1.78 
Real Estate 11 8 6.18 
Social Services 52 2.73 
Communication and Cultural Industry 17 0.89 
Comprehensive 60 3.14 
Total 1,908 100 
Source: Wortdscope and WIND Oataba~ 
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Collective 
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University 
Other 
Total 
Source: Worldscope and WINO Databases 
profit opportunities, uncertainty, and the 
availability of external financing. 
In particular, we regress corporate 
capital expenditures (in relation to 
sa les) on: 
• past capital expenditures, 
• the capital output ratio squared, 
stock market capitalization in rela-
tion to GDP, 
• real interest rates (the change in the 
real effective exchange rate) , 
• real GDP growth (the current ac-
count balance in relation to GDP), 
• foreign debt to GDP ratio, 
the relative price of capital to output, 
• the volatility of output, 
• and a dummy variable representing 
leadership change. 
137 7.18 
762 39.94 
81 4.25 
826 43.29 
19 1.00 
58 3.04 
9 0.47 
16 0.84 
1,908 100 
The firm-level data used in this 
paper are from Worldscope Database 
and Wind Database. It is the same data 
set used in Geng and N'Diaye (2012). 
The database reports on listed financial 
and nonfinancial corporations' annual 
fina ncial statements during 1990-2009. 
The total number of firms included in 
the sample is 1,908 and the total number 
of observations is 7,422. Manufacturing 
firms dominate the sample and account 
for about 58 percent of the reporting 
firms . Private firms account for the largest 
share of ownership (43 percent). Tables 1 
and 2 show a breakdown of the data.' 
Table 3 shows the results of the 
fir m-level data regressions . The results 
indicate that investment is positively 
related to capital market development, 
.C 
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Investment Adjustment Cost squared 
Stock Market Capitalization/GOP 
Real Interest Rate {lagged one year) 
Appreciation of Yuan 
Real GOP Growth 
0.428" (5.58) 
- 0.082** (4.12) 
-o.on* (2 .36) 
Current Account Balance/GOP (lagged one year) 
Relative Price of Capital to GOP 
0.134* (2.48) 
0.066 (1.76) 
0.622** (6.40) 
-0.298* (238) 
1.454** (7.44) 
Volatility of GOP growth (lagged one year) 
Leadership Change Dummy 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
AR(I) 
AR(2) 
• SJgniftant.t the 5-percent lew! 
7,422 
1,908 
0.054 
0.165 
" SignlfK.antat tlw 1 ~"",,,!<'!!J'_""' -___________________ _ 
output growth, and the relative price 
of capital, and negatively related to 
adj ustment costs, real interest rates, 
changes in the real effective exchange 
rate, and uncertainty. While most of 
these results are consistent with what 
has been shown in the literature- e.g., 
capital market development increases 
financing opportunities and instruments 
(Beck and Levine 2001; Leahy et al. 
2001)-the sign of the relative price of 
capital is less obvious. 
Indeed, as shown in Caselli (2007), 
the price of capital relative to that of out-
put is higher the less advanced the econ-
omy. With investment rates being higher 
in general in China, the result in table 1 
could simply be capturing the positive 
relationship that exists between the level 
of development and that of investment. 
Overall, the results are consistent 
with our expectations. Investment falls 
with rising real interest rates, rising 
uncertainty, and the level of economic 
development in China. Investment rises 
with growth opportunities , with financial 
development, and with a depreciating 
currency. This may reflect the dominance 
of manufacturing firms in the sample. 
An analysis of the estimation results 
provides us with some policy implica-
tions about the Chinese economy. 
First, real interest rates have a negative 
impact on investment. At the aggregate 
level, a 100-basis-point increase in real 
interest rates reduces corporate invest-
ment in China by about 0.8 percent of 
GOP. Based on these estimates, raising 
real interest rates to the level of the 
marginal product of capital net of de-
preciation probably would lower invest-
ment by about 2 percent of GOP. 
Second, exchange-rate appreciation 
also lowers investment. A 10-percent 
appreciation would reduce total invest-
ment by around 0.7 percent of GOP. 
The large concentration of manufactur-
ing companies in the firm- level sample 
means that the estimated impact of 
exchange-rate appreciation from the 
firm-level data is large. 
Third, indicators of capital market 
development suggest that as China's 
fina ncial system develops, it tends to pro-
mote higher investment, largely by easing 
the fi nancing constraints faced by firms . 
Now let's consider one of the main 
focuses of this paper. Does the change 
in political leadership in China lead to 
higher investment? A dummy variable 
is included in the regression equation to 
measure this effect. The variable takes 
the value of 1 in the years when a lead-
ership change took place and zero oth-
erwise. The coefficient for the leadership 
dummy variable is positive and statisti-
.0 
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cally significant. In fact, the variable is 
highly significant at the l -percent level. 
Th is shows that leadership changes do 
lead to investment boom in China. 
Investment Implications of the 
Political Cycle 
Empirical results show the close con-
nection between the economy and 
government transitions in China, per-
haps an even closer connection than in 
western countries. The flurry of govern-
ment spending-plan announcements in 
the second half of2012 preceding the 
change in the political leadership high-
lights the deeper political forces still 
at work in China's economy, no matter 
how much it has opened and developed 
in the past three decades. 
With the economic growth rate in 
China dipping toward 7.5 percent from 
a high of about 12 percent a couple 
years ago, the incentive for government 
officials to promote growth is strong. 
The investment projects announced in 
the second half of 2012 were described 
as stimulus initiatives to prop up the 
slowing economy. But the stimulus label 
misses the pOint. The wider political 
context rather than immediate economic 
trouble is the most important factor be-
hind the investment announcements. 
A careful analysis of the historical 
trend in investment spending in China 
shows that a deceleration in investment 
before party congresses is as common 
as the post-congress investment booms. 
When new cadres take local political 
posts following the party congress, they 
plan out their term intent on major 
achievements. These almost always are 
big infrastructure or industrial projects. 
These take time to complete, so the soon-
er they begin, the greater the chance that 
they can be completed during the term. 
This spending binge saddles the 
economy with rising price levels, which 
forces the central government to tighten 
policy for several years to calm the 
economy. Tightening stops in the year of 
the congress. With inflation largely under 
control, the groundwork has been laid for 
more monetary easing and fiscal spending 
© 2013 Investment Management Consultants Association Inc. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved . 
during the year of the political congress. It 
is due to the end of the intervention that 
investment starts going up again. 
Do we expect this close relationship 
between leadership change and invest-
ment boom to continue in the future? It 
depends on how long China can sustain 
such a high rate of investment (currently 
at 50 percent of GOP) against the back-
drop of weak demand from the rest of 
the world. in particular from the United 
States and the Eurozone. Persistent high 
rates of investment run the risk of creat-
ing overcapacity. exerting deflationary 
pressure. increasing nonperforming 
loans in the banking system. and ulti-
mately deteriorating the general govern-
ment's fiscal position (Geng and N'Diaye 
2012). Such a buildup of excess capacity 
also has consequences for the rest of the 
world. as excess capacity in the manu-
facturing sector in China further damp-
ens tradable prices in global markets. 
potentially creating trade tensions. 
The Chinese government realizes 
these risks and envisages in its 12th Five-
Year Development Plan a set of reforms 
to rebalance economic growth away from 
exports and investment toward private 
consumption. Key to such a structural 
change is the plan to reform the financial 
system. which includes liberalizing inter-
est rates. developing capital markets. 
reforming the exchange-rate system. 
and raising the costs of various inputs to 
production-capital. labor. energy. land. 
water-and reducing the high level of 
corporate savings and investment. 
With the possible realization among 
Chinese leaders that they have to rein in 
investment growth or risk a major 
crisis. the economic impact of the politi-
cal cycle may become much weaker in 
the future than in the past. This will hap-
pen if the Chinese policy-makers realize 
the limits of the capital-intensive. infra-
structure-focused growth model. 
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Endnote 
1 The model is estimated using the dynamic 
panel data estimator developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991) with an unbalanced panel 
of 1.908 firms in China during 1990-2009. 
To handle simultaneity. lagged values of the 
contemporaneous regressors were used as 
instruments and a special correction for 
correlation was applied. All variables that 
enter with a lag on the right-hand side of the 
equation are considered. exogenous. 
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